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Boudreaux v. Cummings: Time to Interrupt an 
Erroneous Approach to Acquisitive Prescription 
INTRODUCTION 
In rural Vermilion Parish, the seasonal fall sight is the hustle of harvest 
time. After months of planting crops and watching them grow, Farmer 
Boudreaux was ready to reap the fruits of his labor. As he had done for the 
past 50 years, Boudreaux had his plans down to a methodical science. His 
combines and tractors would enter his right-of-way, travel through his 
neighbor’s land, and arrive at his fields. When harvest day arrived, much 
to Boudreaux’s surprise, the gate to the right-of-way had been chained and 
locked shut.1 After using the right-of-way continuously for so long, 
Boudreaux always believed that he had a legal right of use. However, four 
Louisiana Supreme Court justices disagreed and denied any kind of legal 
access, despite Boudreaux’s long use and adamant belief of his right of 
use.  
Keeping with civilian tradition, the Louisiana Civil Code, which 
governs property disputes like Boudreaux faced, frames legal principles in 
general terms,2 and problems often arise in new areas of the law in which 
the Civil Code provides little or no guidance. In the 1977 revision of the 
Civil Code, acquisitive prescription, known in the common law as 
“adverse possession,”3 applied for the first time to apparent, discontinuous 
servitudes—a legal right to, among other things, use a portion of land 
belonging to another.4 This legal right is the right that Boudreaux believed 
he held.5 The Civil Code provides little guidance for this sweeping change 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by CODY J. MILLER. 
 1. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560–61 (La. 2015) (describing 
the facts of the case similar to this opening paragraph). 
 2. Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A 
Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 
65 LA. L. REV. 775, 793 (2005). 
 3. N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. 
REV. 1265, 1280 (1994) (“Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring 
ownership by possession for a period of time. Similar to acquiring title through 
adverse possession under the statute of limitations.”). 
 4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017). 
 5. The effect of the change in the law was not made retroactive, so time 
could not begin accruing for acquisitive prescription of an apparent, discontinuous 
predial servitude until the effective date of the change. Thus, if there is no good 
faith or just title leading to abridged acquisitive prescription, the soonest someone 
could claim ownership through acquisitive prescription would have been 30 years 
from the 1977 revision. LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a. 
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and left a legal quandary lying dormant for over 30 years.6 Boudreaux v. 
Cummings led the Louisiana Supreme Court to confront the issue of 
acquisitive prescription of a predial servitude,7 but the Court failed to 
apply proper civilian analyses and continued to leave the state of the law 
unclear.  
Acquisitive prescription, or the ability to acquire a real right over a 
specified period of time,8 should have allowed Boudreaux to acquire a 
predial servitude of legal use over a portion of his neighbor’s land.9 A 
divided Supreme Court held, however, that Boudreaux did not acquire a 
predial servitude because “acts of simple tolerance” by his neighbors 
represented tacit permission.10 As the Court provided no clear explanation 
of those acts, its incomplete analyses resulted in two problems. First, the 
Court’s plurality and concurring justices ignored the plain language of the 
Civil Code articles establishing burden-shifting presumptions in favor of 
possessors, altering a previously settled area of the law.11 Second, and 
more importantly, the Court unnecessarily confused the issue of 
acquisitive prescription of predial servitudes through an improper civilian 
approach. By failing to define terms and engage in a complete analysis, 
the justices only recited the relevant Code articles while misapplying 
civilian methodology. 
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the 
fundamentals of proper civilian interpretation of the Civil Code, which 
contains the law on predial servitudes, acquisitive prescription, and 
possession. Putting these foundational principles into the context of a 
specific property law conflict, Part II explains the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boudreaux v. Cummings, revealing the problems that 
arise from the Court’s failure to distinguish between a servitude and the 
underlying land. Part III explores how the Court’s application of civilian 
methods were incomplete. Part IV presents both a retrospective solution 
and a prospective one for future cases despite the improper civilian 
approach used in Boudreaux. It advocates for Louisiana courts to return to 
their civilian roots and approach confusing legal issues with the clarity and 
categorization of civilian deductive reasoning. 
                                                                                                             
 6. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 527 (1991) [hereinafter 
Possession]. 
 7. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 561 (La. 2015). 
 8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3446. 
 9. Id. art. 646 (defining a predial servitude); id. art. 705 (defining a servitude 
of passage). 
 10. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–64. 
 11. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
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I. BACKGROUND: THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS LAND IS MY LAND? 
Unlike the 49 common law states, the sources of law in a civilian 
jurisdiction like Louisiana12 are legislation and custom.13 Property law is 
specifically within the private law domain of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
which governs things and their ownership.14 Although Louisiana law 
admittedly has a distinct common law influence, substantive private law, 
including predial servitudes, acquisitive prescription, and possession, is 
still firmly within the ambit of the civil law.15  
Any well-reasoned analysis must begin with a strong foundation. 
Louisiana judges readily have this foundation, the Civil Code, at their 
disposal, “provid[ing] a solid base from which courts work to decide 
cases.”16 Presenting many property issues and arguments of ownership 
originating deep within the framework of the Civil Code, Boudreaux is the 
perfect case to demonstrate the importance of beginning any civilian 
analysis with the heart of the civil law—the Code. 
A. Servitudes at Your Service 
As the primary source of legislation, the Civil Code is the starting point 
for any examination of predial servitudes,17 acquisitive prescription,18 and 
possession. The Code provides that a predial servitude is “a charge on a 
servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate,” with the two estates 
                                                                                                             
 12. Christopher Osakwe, Louisiana Legal System: A Confluence of Two 
Legal Traditions, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 29, 30 (1986).  
 13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1; id. art. 2 (“Legislation is a solemn expression of 
legislative will.”); id. art. 3 (“Custom results from practice repeated for a long 
time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.”). The two 
sources of law in common law jurisdictions tend to be statutory law and case law 
developed by precedent. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, 
Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
379, 411 (2008). 
 14. Algero, supra note 2, at 793. 
 15. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 
LA. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (1988) (“The modern Louisiana legal system is 
fundamentally a derivative common law system, albeit with a civil law thicket.”). 
 16. Algero, supra note 2, at 778. 
 17. Kinsella, supra note 3, at 1291 (“A predial servitude is a charge on a 
servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. Similar to an appurtenant 
easement.”). 
 18. Id. at 1280 (“Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership 
by possession for a period of time. Similar to acquiring title through adverse 
possession under the statute of limitations.”). 
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having different owners.19 For designation and categorization purposes, a 
predial servitude is an incorporeal immovable,20 which grants a distinct 
right that the dominant estate owner is entitled to exercise.21 There are 
many different types of predial servitudes that estate owners may establish, 
but the most relevant in light of Boudreaux is a servitude of passage, 
explicitly recognized by the Civil Code as “the right for the benefit of the 
dominant estate whereby persons, animals, utilities, or vehicles are 
permitted to pass through the servient estate.”22 
A predial servitude may be established in one of three ways: juridical 
act, prescription, or destination.23 The acquisition of a servitude by 
prescription, however, only applies to apparent servitudes.24 Apparent 
servitudes, as contrasted from nonapparent servitudes, include those 
perceived “by exterior signs, works, or constructions; such as a 
roadway.”25 The 1977 revision of the articles on acquisitive prescription 
distinctly changed the law by applying prescription to apparent servitudes 
broadly, in contrast with only continuous apparent servitudes.26 After the 
revision, prescription now specifically applies to “rights of passage on 
                                                                                                             
 19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017). The “dominant estate” is the one that 
receives the benefit of the servitude. Id. art. 647. The “servient estate” is the one 
that owes the duty of the servitude to the dominant estate. Id. art. 651. In this 
context, an “estate” means “a distinct corporeal immovable” that can be tracts of 
land, buildings, timber estates, or individual apartments. Id. art. 646 cmt. b. 
 20. Id. art. 649. An “incorporeal” is something that “ha[s] no body, but [is] 
comprehended by the understanding.” Id. art. 461. “Immovables” are things like 
tracts of land and their component parts, buildings and their component parts, and 
standing timber. Id. art. 462–67. Thus, “incorporeal immovables” are “[r]ights 
and actions that apply to immovable things.” Id. art. 470. 
 21. Id. art. 476 (providing that a predial servitude is a right in a thing). 
 22. Id. art. 705 (emphasis added to underscore that a predial servitude is a 
“right”). 
 23. Id. art. 654 (stipulating that these three ways are specifically limited to 
conventional and voluntary, rather than legal, servitudes). By “juridical act,” the 
article refers to the “establishment of a predial servitude by title [as] an alienation 
of a part of the property.” Id. art. 708. By “destination,” the article refers to the 
creation of a servitude stemming from “a relationship established between two 
estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates 
belonged to different owners,” and that relationship becomes an apparent 
servitude as a default rule “[w]hen the two estates cease to belong to the same 
owner.” Id. art. 741. 
 24. Id. art. 740 (omitting any reference to the ability to acquisitively prescribe 
on a nonapparent servitude).  
 25. Id. art. 707. 
 26. Id. art. 740 cmt. a. 
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land,”27 which was the issue in Boudreaux.28 Acquisitive prescription on 
an apparent, but discontinuous, servitude consequently could not begin to 
run until January 1, 1978,29 so any examination of the requisite elements 
of possession to determine whether prescription has taken place must 
begin with that date.  
B. Possession: The Foundation of Prescription 
The law of possession underlies the inquiry into whether a person like 
Boudreaux acquired a real right through acquisitive prescription. The Civil 
Code defines possession as “the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing,” 
whether movable or immovable, that someone exercises or has someone else 
exercise on his or her behalf.30 One element of the definition that 
fundamentally contradicts the definition of a predial servitude is that 
possession requires an underlying corporeal, or physical, thing.31 An 
adjustment is necessary to fit this definition to an incorporeal—nonphysical—
thing such as a predial servitude.32  
The Civil Code provides this adjustment by establishing an analogous 
concept, “quasi-possession,” to apply to an incorporeal servitude: “The 
exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it as one’s 
own is quasi-possession.”33 Notwithstanding the difference in terminology, 
all of the other articles are to apply to quasi-possession by analogy.34 
                                                                                                             
 27. Christopher M. Hannan, Prescription Lenses: How Louisiana Courts 
Should Apply the Revised Articles Governing Thirty-Year Acquisitive Prescription 
of Apparent Servitudes, 53 LOY. L. REV. 937, 939–40 (2007). 
 28. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015). 
 29. Comment a states, “[A]pparent servitudes may be acquired by 
prescription or by destination of the owner, even though they might be considered 
discontinuous under the regime of the 1870 Code and thus insusceptible of such 
modes of acquisition.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a. 
 30. Id. art. 3421 (emphasis added). 
 31. JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A PRÉCIS 175 
(2012). 
 32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (“Corporeals are things that have a body, . . . and 
can be felt or touched. Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are 
comprehended by the understanding.”). This Code article explains the fundamental 
difference between corporeal and incorporeal things. Because of the presupposition 
that possession requires a corporeal thing, the fundamental difference between 
corporeal and incorporeal things makes the conceptualization of possession itself 
impossible. An adjustment to provide for an incorporeal thing is necessary. 
TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 175–76. 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421. 
 34. Id. 
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Beyond this one distinction, however, the Civil Code is silent on how to 
put the analogy into actual practice and does not offer any special rules 
with which judges and practitioners should proceed.35 Using doctrine to 
help expand the skeletal principles outlined by the Civil Code, the 
Dictionary of the Civil Code defines quasi-possession as “that possession 
. . . which leads to the acquisition of a real right other than ownership . . . 
by performing, for a certain time, acts which are the same as those of the 
exercise of the real right in question.”36 This definition draws out the 
analogy by emphasizing how to apply the constitutive elements of 
possession to quasi-possession. 
For possession to be legally effective, it must include the two 
component elements of animus, which is a state of mind, and corpus, 
which is engaging in certain activity.37 The Civil Code defines corpus as 
“the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a 
thing.”38 With this emphasis on physical acts, the codal definition of 
corpus needs an adjustment to be applicable to incorporeal things. Using 
the method of analogy as directed by the Civil Code, corpus of an 
incorporeal thing, such as a servitude, may instead be termed “quasi-
corpus” and would include “the exercise of acts of use or enjoyment of the 
rights afforded by that servitude.”39 With this emphasis on using the real 
right itself, as opposed to physical acts on the thing, the definition of quasi-
corpus retains the basic idea of use and enjoyment. By making a direct 
connection to the right itself, the definition makes it easier to conceive of 
an assertion of mental ownership over something that does not exist in 
space. 
Once a potential possessor establishes corpus, the Civil Code further 
requires a necessary state of mind, or animus, for effective possession. For 
animus to exist, “one must intend to possess as owner.”40 Although the 
definition initially appears broad enough to apply to both corporeal and 
incorporeal things, the article fails to clarify how one can “own” a predial 
servitude, which itself is a right distinct from ownership.41 Adapting 
animus to an incorporeal thing through quasi-animus, “one must intend to 
                                                                                                             
 35. Possession, supra note 6, at 527. 
 36. GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 467 (Alain Levasseur 
& Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Lageais trans., 2014).  
 37. Possession, supra note 6, at 524–25. 
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3425. 
 39. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176. 
 40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3424. “[O]ne who takes corporeal possession of a 
thing is presumed to have the intent to own it.” Id. art. 3424 cmt. b. 
 41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476. 
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have the right or rights afforded by that servitude as one’s own.”42 Because 
the idea of a nonphysical thing is difficult to grasp, the emphasis of quasi-
animus involving the intention of holding the real right at issue helps to 
clarify the concept. For both animus and quasi-animus, the Civil Code 
provides a rebuttable presumption that a possessor has the requisite animus 
as long as that person did not begin to possess for someone else.43 The 
limitation on that presumption introduces precarious possession, which 
occurs when a person begins possession of a thing with the permission of 
the supposed owner.44 
C. Like Oil and Water: Precarious Possession and Acquisitive 
Prescription 
To be effective, possession must include both of the requisite elements 
of corpus and animus.45 If there is no animus, then the acts “take place 
merely as acts of toleration.”46 The absence of animus or the admittance 
of proof that possession began on someone else’s behalf implicates the 
concept of precarious possession, which is insufficient for acquisitive 
prescription.47 The Civil Code defines precarious possession as “[t]he 
exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of 
the owner or possessor.”48 The precarious possessor in turn suffers from a 
legal presumption that he or she is presumed “to possess for another 
although he may intend to possess for himself.”49 This presumption is an 
important part of defeating acquisitive prescription and can be fatal to both 
a supposed possessor and quasi-possessor.50 
                                                                                                             
 42. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176. 
 43. “One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess 
in the name of and for another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427. The presumption helps 
ameliorate the problem that a person’s subjective state of mind may be difficult to 
prove. 
 44. Id. arts. 3437–3440. 
 45. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 742 (La. State Law 
Inst. trans., 2005). 
 46. Id. 
 47. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3437 (defining precarious possession), 3477 (explaining 
precarious possessors cannot acquisitively prescribe on a thing). 
 48. Id. art. 3437. 
 49. Id. art. 3438. 
 50. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562 (La. 2015) (explaining that 
if Boudreaux suffered from the legal presumption, possessed precariously, and 
had not followed the requisite steps to cure that precariousness, he could never 
prescribe). 
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The Civil Code is clear that precarious possession is incompatible with 
the concept of acquisitive prescription, stating that “[a]cquisitive prescription 
does not run in favor of a precarious possessor or his universal successor.”51 
Assuming that there is true possession with both corpus and animus, 
possessors may be able to use acquisitive prescription as “a mode of acquiring 
ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.”52 There 
are two types of acquisitive prescription for immovable things, abridged 
and unabridged.53 For abridged acquisitive prescription, possessors and 
quasi-possessors may acquire ownership or other real rights after a delay 
of ten years.54 This abridged acquisitive prescription requires both good 
faith and just title.55 For unabridged acquisitive prescription, possessors 
and quasi-possessors may acquire ownership or other real rights after a 
delay of 30 years with no requirement of good faith or just title.56 
Assuming all requirements are met, a supposed possessor or quasi-
possessor may begin to make a case for acquisitive prescription. 
D. Putting It All Together: Judges as Methodological Mixers 
To make a determinative ruling on whether rights have been validly 
acquired through acquisitive prescription, judges must utilize the various 
interpretive tools and methodology provided in the civilian tradition. A 
proper use of legal methodology is key for Louisiana judges to take the 
basic general principles of the law and apply them to concrete situations.57 
Although enacted law is always the starting point in civilian methodology, 
there are a variety of secondary sources that can aid judges in interpretation. 
These secondary sources include commentary, doctrine, and jurisprudence.58 
Particularly in the area of property law, judges must use civilian methods of 
interpretation as the private law contained in the Civil Code remains civilian 
at its core.59 If the legislature has written the laws in a traditional civilian 
style, the only proper way to interpret and apply them correctly is in a 
similar fashion. Such faithfulness to the civilian tradition and an 
                                                                                                             
 51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3477. 
 52. Id. art. 3446. 
 53. See id. arts. 3473, 3486. 
 54. Id. art. 3473. 
 55. Id. art. 3475. 
 56. Id. art. 3486. 
 57. Algero, supra note 2, at 777. 
 58. Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology: Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 
44 TUL. L. REV. 673, 680 (1970). 
 59. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 38.  
2017] COMMENT 1151 
 
 
 
acknowledgment of the importance of the Civil Code follow directly from 
“the judge’s constitutional oath to support the law.”60  
The first step in civilian methodology is consultation of the Civil Code 
itself.61 Property law retains the civilian characteristics of generalized 
wording that “provides a solid base from which courts work to decide 
cases.”62 If ambiguities remain after legislative application and 
interpretation, the next step is consultation of doctrine. Doctrine represents 
an interpretation of the law itself and of its rationale, as opposed to the 
common law consultation of case law, which emphasizes facts over law.63 
Doctrine is a critical element of the civilian approach because of its ability 
to comment on “the rules and the principles . . . of impure elements, and 
thus provide both the practice and the courts with a guide for the 
solution.”64 Louisiana judges confronting issues of substantive private law 
have these interpretive tools at their ready disposal. 
II. BOUDREAUX V. CUMMINGS: LEGAL BREAKTHROUGH 
OR BREAKDOWN? 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s review of Boudreaux v. Cummings 
could have been the perfect case for a proper application of the Civil Code 
and the civilian methods of interpretation. Confronting an area of property 
law within the Civil Code, the Court had the opportunity to use its civilian 
tools to resolve whether an incorporeal predial servitude was created over 
a corporeal piece of land.65 Armed with the Civil Code directive to 
analogize the law of acquisitive prescription and possession to predial 
servitudes, the justices confronted this novel issue in Boudreaux v. 
Cummings.  
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In rural Vermilion Parish, two adjacent landowners, John Boudreaux 
and Paul Cummings, were neighbors.66 A pathway over Cummings’s land 
                                                                                                             
 60. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and 
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993). 
 61. Id. at 10. 
 62. Algero, supra note 2, at 778. 
 63. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law 
(Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 701 (2000). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015). 
 66. Id. 
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connected Boudreaux’s land to one of the nearby public roads.67 
Boudreaux claimed that he and his ancestors-in-title had used the path 
since at least 1948 “to transport farm equipment, to get to and from town 
for personal errands, and for convenient access to the adjacent road.”68 
Although Cummings’s ancestors-in-title, the Weills, were aware of 
Boudreaux’s use, they never prevented it.69 In fact, the testimony indicated 
that both parties used the path and that Boudreaux and the Weills had 
worked together in moving the path to a more convenient location in 
1969.70 Boudreaux and others acting on his behalf made continuous use of 
the path until Cummings locked the gate in 2012, preventing any use.71 
Boudreaux subsequently brought suit, claiming the acquisition of a predial 
servitude of passage.72 
The trial court ruled in Boudreaux’s favor, claiming that he had 
acquired a predial servitude of passage through acquisitive prescription of 
30 years.73 The judge “found precarious possession was irrelevant to a 
discussion of ownership of an incorporeal immovable, such as a predial 
servitude.”74 The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
finding that “there was adequate evidence for the trial court to conclude 
that Boudreaux was using the right of way on his own behalf, rather than 
as a precarious possessor.”75 The dissenting judge, however, reasoned that 
Boudreaux’s use was premised on permission from the Weills, meaning 
prescription could not run in his favor as a precarious possessor.76 This 
divergence at the appellate level foreshadowed the divide in opinions that 
would occur at the Louisiana Supreme Court.77 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 562. 
 70. Id. at 560, 571. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 560. 
 74. Id. at 560–61. 
 75. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 138 So. 3d 797, 799 (La. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 
167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015). 
 76. Id. at 801 (Amy, J., dissenting). 
 77. The resolution of Boudreaux by the Court resulted in a plurality opinion 
authored by Justice Clark, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Weimer, a 
dissenting opinion by Justice Knoll, and a dissenting opinion by Justice Crichton. 
See generally Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015). 
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B. The Right-of-Way: A Not So Apparent Servitude 
In Boudreaux, the Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed whether 
Boudreaux had acquired a predial servitude of passage by acquisitive 
prescription of 30 years.78 If Boudreaux did not begin his possession 
adversely, then the next issue became whether he had given actual notice 
to Cummings, or to Cummings’s ancestor-in-title, that he was beginning 
to possess for himself.79 
First, regarding acquisitive prescription, the Court concluded that 
Boudreaux’s quasi-possession of the passageway was not adverse, so 
acquisitive prescription could not begin to run in his favor as a precarious 
quasi-possessor.80 Second, regarding the termination of precarious 
possession, the Court concluded that Boudreaux did not give the requisite 
actual notice to Cummings, or to the Weills, so he remained a precarious 
possessor.81 In the end, “acquisitive prescription could not and did not run 
in [Boudreaux’s] favor.”82 
Citing primarily to A. N. Yiannopoulos’s Treatise on Predial 
Servitudes, among other works, the plurality discussed how precarious 
quasi-possession, in contrast to adverse quasi-possession, can occur even 
with merely implied permission or with acts of “indulgence” or “good 
neighborhood.”83 The Weills and Cummings, with a spirit of neighborliness, 
had allowed Boudreaux to use the pathway uninterrupted, even if they never 
gave actual, express permission. With this at least implied permission, the 
Court held that Boudreaux could not benefit from the presumption that, as 
quasi-possessor, he was quasi-possessing as owner.84 Instead, Boudreaux 
suffered from the presumption that he began his quasi-possession 
precariously. When precarious quasi-possessors other than co-owners wish 
to terminate their precariousness, they must provide actual notice to the 
person on whose behalf they are quasi-possessing, and Boudreaux offered 
no evidence to show that he had provided such notice.85 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 561. 
 79. Id. at 564. The Civil Code gives the only method in which a precarious 
possessor may terminate his or her precariousness vis-à-vis someone other than a 
co-owner: “[W]hen he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on whose 
behalf he is possessing.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439 (2017). 
 80. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564 (explaining that Boudreaux lacked the 
proper animus because his possession was with permission of the owner). 
 81. Id. at 564–65. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 563. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 562–64. 
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Justice Weimer concurred in the holding of the plurality but provided 
his own reasoning. He explained that, if implied permission can be derived 
from acts of neighborliness, then a supposed quasi-possessor is presumed 
to be engaging in precarious quasi-possession in such a situation, and the 
quasi-possessor would have to rebut the presumption.86 In his opinion, 
Justice Weimer explained that Cummings provided sufficient evidence to 
support the presumption, including collaboration between the Weills and 
Boudreaux in relocating the passageway and beneficial use by both 
parties.87 The Weills allowed Boudreaux to use the passage “in the spirit 
of being a good neighbor” and “for maintaining good relations.”88 Based 
on these friendly, neighborly acts and what could at best be an equivocal 
quasi-possession of the passageway, Justice Weimer reasoned that 
Boudreaux remained a precarious quasi-possessor.89 
C. An Analysis from Outside the Civil Code 
With incomplete civilian methodology and confusing analyses, the 
resulting opinions from Boudreaux cause more confusion than certainty in 
the law. An analysis of the plurality and concurring opinions reveals two 
principal problems. First, although unstated in their discussions, the 
justices’ reasoning could result in possible changes in the legal 
presumptions applied to acquisitive prescription. Second, and more 
importantly, the justices conflate two distinct legal categories, collapsing 
the incorporeal real servitude right and the underlying corporeal land into 
one issue. 
1. Legislating from the Bench 
The analyses of both the plurality and the concurrence lead to undesirable 
consequences that change, or at least confuse, the legal presumptions applied 
to acquisitive prescription. Because the purported possessor is the only one 
who knows his or her true state of mind, the proper animus of a possessor is 
difficult to prove. Consequently, the Civil Code introduces presumptions to 
aid in overcoming this difficult burden.90 An examination of animus under 
the facts of Boudreaux necessarily began with the default rule that 
Boudreaux, exercising quasi-corpus over the servitude,91 was presumed to 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 570 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 571. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 569–72. 
 90. Possession, supra note 6, at 554. 
 91. See discussion on “quasi-corpus” supra Part I.A. 
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be in quasi-possession.92 The burden was then on Cummings to introduce 
sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption.93 The plurality initially 
recognized the importance of an effective rebuttal, underscoring the 
importance of Cummings’s knowledge and acquiescence of Boudreaux’s 
use as evidence that prescription never began to run.94 The concurrence 
also recognized the importance of such evidence, pointing to “neighborly 
acts” as proof that Boudreaux was never a true possessor.95 The dissenting 
opinion by Justice Knoll, however, noted how the other opinions quickly 
deviate from the presumption by “eviscerat[ing] the well-established 
burden-shifting structure laid out in our Civil Code, allowing Cummings 
to prevail based simply on an assertion of ‘neighborliness,’ despite his 
failure to put on any evidence.”96 Though correctly stating the law, as the 
dissent noted, the plurality and concurrence misapplied the true intention 
of the law. 
Boudreaux, as the quasi-possessor of the servitude, should have 
benefited from the presumption that he was quasi-possessing as owner. 
For Cummings to defeat this presumption, he needed to show through 
evidence and therefore prove that Boudreaux’s quasi-possession was 
precarious.97 The only proof that Cummings offered into evidence was that 
Boudreaux and the Weills were good neighbors, which directly conflicted 
with Boudreaux’s testimony: “I never got any permission . . . . We just 
used [the right-of-way].”98 Boudreaux even offered further evidence 
proving his true quasi-possession, including witness testimony about 
continuous maintenance of the passage, contracts involving use of the 
passage, and protection of the passage from possible public works 
construction.99 Beyond mere assertions of being good neighbors, 
Cummings did not offer any other evidence that could conclusively prove 
that Boudreaux began his possession precariously.100 
                                                                                                             
 92. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (2017). 
 93. Id. art. 3432 cmt. b. 
 94. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564 (“[W]e find support for the conclusion that 
Cummings’ awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his allowance thereof marks 
Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use.” (emphasis added)). 
 95. Id. at 569 (Weimer, J., concurring) (“I find that the evidence of neighborly 
acts . . . effectively rebuts any presumption.” (emphasis added)). 
 96. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). As a note, for the remainder of this 
Comment, when reference is made to the “dissenting opinion,” it is to the one 
authored by Justice Knoll. 
 97. Id. at 566. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 567. 
 100. Id. at 568. 
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By allowing this low bar for Cummings to defeat the established legal 
presumption in favor of Boudreaux, the Court makes the acquisitive 
prescription of a servitude as provided in the Civil Code nearly impossible. 
For quasi-possession to be precarious, the Code requires either permission 
from the owner or that quasi-possession was “on behalf of the owner.”101 
Although civilian doctrine favorably endorses the idea of tacit permission, 
and the Code seems to allow for that possibility,102 a distinction must be 
drawn between actual ongoing tacit permission and convenient assertions 
of tacit permission that occur after prescription has perhaps already run.  
As the dissent recognized, the plurality’s analysis makes it nearly 
impossible for someone to prescribe on an apparent servitude because 
mere assertions of neighborly acts are sufficient to foreclose the running 
of prescription.103 The dissent should have taken this observation, refined 
it, and developed it further to its logical conclusion. Rather than making a 
wholesale denial of the ability of tacit permission to defeat quasi-
possession, the dissent seems to underscore the fact that a party should do 
more than merely state such a legal conclusion. By allowing a mere 
assertion of good neighborliness after the fact, the plurality and 
concurrence ignored the plain language that a quasi-possessor is presumed 
to have animus “unless he began to possess . . . for another.”104 As opposed 
to requiring actual evidence that tacit permission was present from the 
beginning of the possessory period, the Court’s low standard that allows 
assertions of tacit permission after the fact makes the acquisition of a predial 
servitude by prescription constructively impossible.  
After Boudreaux, a party may merely assert acts of good neighborliness 
to defeat an opposing party’s claim for rights stemming from possession, 
even if there is no evidence of permission or of quasi-possession begun for 
another. The justices acted as lawmakers rather than as law interpreters by 
changing the law or at least distorting legislative will.105 The Court allowed 
mere assertions of tolerance to prove precariousness, and this possible 
change in the law stems from the Court’s failure to engage in proper civilian 
analysis. 
                                                                                                             
 101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2017). 
 102. Id.; PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 738–39. 
 103. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 568 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (emphasis added). The person challenging the 
quasi-possession must have “shown that the possession was begun for another” 
before precarious possession is established. Id. art. 3427 cmt. d (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. art. 2 (“Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”).  
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2. One is Not Like the Other: Confusion of the Incorporeal Right 
with the Corporeal Land 
The recurring problem with all of the various opinions in Boudreaux 
is the confusion of the incorporeal predial servitude, the right at issue in 
the case, with the underlying corporeal land. Instead of recognizing two 
distinct legal categories, the justices collapsed the incorporeal predial 
servitude and the underlying corporeal land into one category.106 By 
conflating these two distinct issues, the resulting analyses are difficult to 
read and create legal uncertainty. This confusion stems from a failure to 
proceed systematically in a civilian fashion—neither defining legal terms 
nor proceeding with an adequately formed foundation.  
One commentator foresaw the legal confusion that could result by 
allowing acquisitive prescription on discontinuous predial servitudes: 
“[S]ome of the changes may conflict with other articles of the Code or 
result in unanticipated effects.”107 That conflict underlies the Court’s 
analyses because the relevant Code articles apply to corporeal things, 
distinctly different from the incorporeal things by which the articles are to 
apply by analogy. The critical distinction that one must make when dealing 
with an incorporeal right, such as a servitude, is the difference between the 
incorporeal right and the corporeal land on which the servitude is 
exercised. The person attempting to gain a servitude “possesses the real 
right with the intent to have it as his own. However, he does not possess 
the immovable that is burdened with his real right because he has no intent 
to own that immovable.”108 The Court provides no explanation regarding 
how to apply the Code articles, which themselves contemplate corporeal 
things,109 to the incorporeal servitude at issue.110 The failure of the Court 
to make this critical distinction is the key to understanding the subsequent 
confusion. 
Although the plurality began its analysis correctly when stating that it 
was to determine whether to “recogniz[e] the plaintiff as the owner of a 
                                                                                                             
 106. See, e.g., Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562 (explaining that Boudreaux was 
trying to prescribe on a predial servitude and that he would have had to have given 
actual notice to the landowner). 
 107. Hannan, supra note 27, at 978. 
 108. Possession, supra note 6, at 541. 
 109. See supra Part I.B. 
 110. For example, the plurality points to “support in the law for implied or tacit 
permission being the basis of precarious possession,” but provides no discussion 
regarding how to apply that general characteristic of possession contemplating 
corporeal things to an incorporeal servitude. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562. 
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predial servitude over land owned by the defendant,”111 it erred when it 
stated that, if Boudreaux were a precarious quasi-possessor, it would need 
to determine whether Boudreaux ever changed his precarious status 
through “actual notice to the landowner.”112 The plurality’s statement, 
without any further explanation, is illogical because actual notice to the 
landowner is not related to whether there is quasi-possession of a 
servitude. Actual notice would instead have to be to the servitude owner. 
Similarly, the concurring opinion collapsed the incorporeal servitude and 
the corporeal land into one issue as well. The concurrence described the 
lack of Boudreaux’s “intent[ion] to possess, as owner, the passageway” 
and referenced the need to give actual “notice to Mr. Weill,” as owner.113 
Putting those two assertions together, the concurrence equated Weill with 
the owner of the servitude, when in fact Weill was merely the owner of the 
underlying land instead. This confusion stems from the concurrence’s own 
equivocal use of the word “passageway” to describe what Boudreaux was 
trying to acquire through prescription.114 Finally, the principal dissenting 
opinion failed to make a clear distinction between the incorporeal 
servitude and the land, interchanging different elements of each.115 
Because the issue in Boudreaux was prescription of an incorporeal 
servitude of passage, the opinions’ loose use of terminology evidences a 
failure to distinguish the servitude from the underlying land. 
The plain language from the Civil Code clearly explains that 
precarious quasi-possession “over a thing” occurs “with the permission of 
or on behalf of the owner or possessor.”116 A precarious quasi-possessor 
can terminate the precarious nature by “giv[ing] actual notice . . . to the 
person on whose behalf he is possessing.”117 Reading in pari materia, a 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 562. 
 113. Id. at 572 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 114. The use of the term “passageway” implies an attempt to prescribe on the 
physical land rather than on the servitude because a passageway is “[a] long, 
narrow way, typically having walls on either side, that allows access between 
buildings or to different rooms within a building.” Passageway, OXFORD LIVING 
DICTIONARIES: ENGLISH, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/passage 
way [https://perma.cc/7NQD-ASB2] (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
 115. An example of one such interchanging: “[W]hether [Boudreaux] 
exercised this real right merely as a ‘precarious possessor’—that is, ‘with the 
permission of or on behalf of’ Paul Christopher Cummings.” Boudreaux, 167 So. 
3d at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). The dissent thus also confused the incorporeal 
servitude with the underlying corporeal land, making the landowner the same 
person to own the incorporeal servitude. Id. 
 116. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2017). 
 117. Id. art. 3439. 
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person must give this notice to the owner or possessor of the thing over 
which he or she is asserting quasi-possession. Because the thing in 
Boudreaux was a predial servitude, if Boudreaux did indeed begin his 
possession precariously, there would be no reason for him to change his 
status vis-à-vis the landowner. Rather, he would instead have to provide 
actual notice to the servitude owner, if there were one.118 The opinions 
imply a logical impossibility by stating someone might be a precarious 
possessor of an incorporeal servitude and then immediately asking 
whether that person gave notice to the owner of corporeal land to end the 
precariousness. This unfortunate confusion denies Boudreaux’s claim for 
an incorporeal servitude simply because he could not prescribe on the 
underlying corporeal land itself, contrary to the plain language of the Civil 
Code.119  
Had the Court consulted the limited jurisprudence, it would have 
realized that permission to be on the land does not alone mean that a 
servitude is precarious and that prescription is barred.120 In Levet v. 
Lapeyrollerie, at issue was whether one of the parties had acquired, 
through acquisitive prescription, an apparent, continuous predial servitude 
of drain.121 Instead of including broad statements that permission 
automatically excluded the running of prescription on a predial servitude, 
the Court noted that the party claiming prescription had received “the 
consent of [the landowner to dig] the canal.”122 The parties claiming 
prescription in both Levet and Boudreaux had permission to be on the land, 
the underlying corporeal thing, but neither case included any evidence of 
whether there was permission to have a right over the land, such as a 
predial servitude. The Levet Court, however, did not allow permission to 
be on the land to defeat prescription on a servitude, providing that the party 
                                                                                                             
 118. A precarious possessor can end precariousness by actually notifying “the 
person on whose behalf he is possessing.” Id. If Boudreaux was indeed possessing 
the servitude precariously, he would have had to notify the servitude owner rather 
than the landowner of his intention to begin possessing for himself. In Boudreaux, 
as there was no servitude, there was no servitude owner for Boudreaux to notify. 
 119. See id. art. 740 (allowing for the creation of a servitude by acquisitive 
prescription without requiring the ability to prescribe on the underlying land). 
 120. See Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 1 So. 672, 673–74 (La. 1887) (holding that a 
predial servitude of drain was created through acquisitive prescription despite the 
fact that the dominant estate owner had the permission of the servient estate 
owner); Guillote v. Wells, 485 So. 2d 187, 190–91 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
that the plaintiff acquired a personal servitude of right of use by title over a gas 
pipeline despite the fact there was an oral agreement of permission to use it). 
 121. Levet, 1 So. at 673. 
 122. Id. 
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claiming prescription was “equally capable of acquiring [the servitude of 
drain] by possession for the requisite length of time.”123 Had the Court in 
Boudreaux consulted this limited, but important, jurisprudence, the 
justices could have separated the two issues more easily, and the 
permission claimed by Cummings would not have summarily defeated 
Boudreaux’s claims.  
By failing to consider the jurisprudence, the Court engaged in an 
analysis tainted by an erroneous premise. Starting from the assertion that 
Boudreaux began quasi-possession of the servitude with the permission of 
his neighbor, the Court collapsed the servitude and the underlying land 
into one issue, leading to an analysis incompatible with the Civil Code. 
There is no question that Cummings, as the adjacent landowner, owned 
the underlying corporeal land. The Court’s language, however, results in 
confusion as to whether Boudreaux possessed the corporeal land on behalf 
of Cummings or the incorporeal servitude on behalf of Cummings. 
Without any explanatory analysis, the opinions produce logically 
inconsistent statements that conflate the land with the servitude, a problem 
that could have been avoided with proper civilian methodology. 
III. BOUDREAUX V. CUMMINGS: AN ERRONEOUS 
CIVILIAN METHODOLOGY 
The failure to distinguish an incorporeal servitude from the underlying 
corporeal land not only results in a confusing analysis but also forecloses 
any possibility of reaching a logically consistent conclusion. A proper 
civilian methodology dictates following all premises completely to their 
logical conclusions by systematically using logic and deduction to proceed 
“from the general to the particular.”124 Erring in the application of this 
fundamental civilian approach, all of the Court’s opinions in Boudreaux 
misstated their general premises and stopped too early in their respective 
analyses. Consequently, taking the Court’s premises and following them 
to their logical conclusions reveals inconsistencies between the opinions 
and the Civil Code as a whole.  
A. In the Beginning is the Code 
As the fountainhead of private law in Louisiana,125 the Civil Code is 
the foundation on which courts must build their legal analyses. Judges 
must place their legal reasoning into the framework of the Code’s general 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. at 674. 
 124. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1083. 
 125. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 41. 
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articles because they are “required to return again and again to the Code 
seeking its guiding values and adhering as closely to them as possible.”126 
If the Supreme Court justices had viewed the Civil Code as a unified whole 
and formulated their analyses from that general foundation, they would 
have avoided the ensuing inconsistency. There are two errors that are 
particularly prominent once the Court’s analyses are compared with the 
relevant codal provisions. 
First, by not consulting the portion of the Civil Code explaining 
predial servitudes, the Court’s opinions all failed to identify the 
fundamental characteristic of predial servitudes: they require two different 
estates with two different owners.127 If such a characteristic does not 
obtain, then the civilian concept of confusion results, leading to either the 
extinction of a pre-existing servitude or the inability for one to form in the 
first instance.128 If, as the Court’s various opinions suggest, Boudreaux 
possessed the servitude precariously on behalf of Cummings, then the next 
logical step must be that Cummings was both the dominant estate owner 
and the servient estate owner. This conclusion, however, is incompatible 
with the requirement that a servitude must have different estate owners,129 
and the lack of any explanation by the Court results in an absurd 
conclusion. 
Second, the various opinions are incomplete in their analyses, leading 
to confusion over the meaning of precarious possession and precarious 
quasi-possession. By ignoring the only immediately relevant Civil Code 
article130 and directly applying the articles on possession to quasi-
possession, the Court’s resulting conclusions conflict with the basic 
foundation of the law. The Court failed to acknowledge that, when 
analyzing the quasi-possession of an incorporeal real right rather than the 
possession of a corporeal thing, “things are not nearly so black and white. 
In fact, quasi-possession, far from being incompatible with . . . a grant of 
permission, presupposes it!”131 Although a fundamental characteristic of a 
servitude is permission to use the underlying corporeal immovable, none 
of the opinions made this fundamental distinction. The Court’s failure to 
acknowledge the characteristic elements of quasi-possession by analogy 
caused the justices to miss a fundamental reality: a quasi-possessor is at 
                                                                                                             
 126. Dennis, supra note 60, at 17. 
 127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017). 
 128. Id. art. 765 (explaining the working of “confusion” to terminate a predial 
servitude when one and the same person comes to own the entirety of both the 
dominant estate and the servient estate burdened by the servitude).  
 129. Id. art. 646. 
 130. Id. art. 3421. 
 131. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176.  
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one and the same time both a true, or not precarious, quasi-possessor of 
the servitude real right and a precarious possessor of the underlying 
corporeal immovable.132 The absolute insistence on permission defeating 
the acquisition of a predial servitude is incomprehensible when fit into the 
proper framework of true quasi-possession of a servitude. Though a 
servitude implies permission to be on the underlying land, there is not, by 
that fact alone, permission to hold the accompanying incorporeal real 
right.  
To remedy this confusion, the Court should have contemplated the 
meaning of precarious quasi-possession of an incorporeal servitude. One 
illustration of such quasi-possession is as follows. X receives a predial 
servitude of passage by acquiring a title thereto from the landowner, Y. X, 
in turn, grants a lease on that incorporeal servitude of passage to Z. In that 
instance, as a lessee, Z is a precarious quasi-possessor of the servitude 
because he is quasi-possessing it with the permission of the servitude 
owner, X. The only way for Z to end his precarious possession would be 
to give actual notice to the owner of the servitude—the “thing” in 
question—that he was beginning true quasi-possession.133 By failing to 
contemplate this key legal distinction between an incorporeal servitude as 
separate from the underlying land, the justices reached the conclusion that 
“Boudreaux was possessing the right of passage precariously.”134 If the 
Court had not intended to reach this conclusion that flows from its 
premises, the justices should not have neglected to apply the articles on 
quasi-possession as they were intended—by analogy. 
B. Legal History Repeats Itself  
The plurality and concurring opinions’ inconsistent results and logical 
failures when applying the Civil Code may be surprising, but Boudreaux 
is not the first case involving predial servitudes in which the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has engaged in erroneous civilian analysis. The Court 
heard a remarkably similar case 40 years before Boudreaux. In Louisiana 
Irrigation & Mill Company v. Pousson, at issue was whether there was an 
aqueduct servitude established over the immovable property of several 
landowners, including the defendant.135 By making statements like “[t]he 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at 176 n.6 (“[T]he servitude holder, through one and the same acts, 
simultaneously quasi-possesses the servitude for himself and precariously possesses 
the underlying corporeal immovable for his grantor, [which is] ‘compound’ 
possession.”).  
 133. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439. 
 134. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. 2015). 
 135. Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co. v. Pousson, 265 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. 1972). 
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described servitude was a canal” and “[t]here is no allegation that plaintiff 
possessed the canal,”136 the majority’s first error was collapsing the 
incorporeal predial servitude and the underlying corporeal canal into one 
thing. The Pousson Court failed to clarify whether the issue for it to decide 
was the acquisition of an incorporeal servitude of aqueduct or of a 
corporeal canal. 
The Pousson majority also erroneously equated the actions that would 
be sufficient for eviction of a regular possessor to what would be sufficient 
to evict a quasi-possessor. This equation stemmed from the Court’s failure 
to proceed by analogy. Because a servitude is an incorporeal thing and 
does not physically exist in space, multiple people can use the same 
underlying corporeal thing—a canal in Pousson—at the same time.137 
Theoretically, there are no actions that should result in an automatic 
eviction from an incorporeal servitude, yet the majority still noted: “The 
1967 and 1968 usurpation of the lateral canal by defendant clearly resulted 
in a loss of possession by plaintiff.”138 If the defendant and plaintiff used 
the canal at the same time, there would have been no usurpation if both 
had been able to use it fully. By failing to notice the basic legal principles 
regarding possession and quasi-possession of the Civil Code, the resulting 
analysis by the majority does not fit logically into the larger statutory 
scheme.  
Unlike Boudreaux, however, not all of the Pousson opinions failed to 
use proper civilian methodology. The dissenting opinion proceeded 
systematically with the general principles of the Civil Code and carefully 
incorporated proper language and categorization of the things in 
question.139 The opinion neatly kept the issues clear and avoided a 
conflation of the incorporeal servitude with the corporeal canal.140 The 
dissent carefully noted that use of the portion of a canal was a “species of 
quasi-possession of th[e] incorporeal right” and that such a use comported 
with “that species of possession of which the right was susceptible.”141 
Unlike the loose and interchangeable language used by the majority to 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 649 (classifying a predial servitude as an incorporeal 
immovable, meaning it does not exist in space); id. art. 748 (charging that a servient 
estate owner can do nothing to make the servitude use more inconvenient). Putting 
these two provisions together, as long as multiple predial servitudes do not diminish 
the other holders’ enjoyment, it is theoretically possible for there to be multiple 
servitudes over one servient estate. 
 138. Pousson, 265 So. 2d at 758. 
 139. Id. at 76162 (Barham, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 763. 
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describe the issue, the dissenter carefully chose clear language: “[P]laintiff 
continually possessed the right to operate the irrigation canal for many 
years.”142 By emphasizing the right over the canal, the dissenting opinion 
maintained the critical distinction. Unfortunately, the majority in Pousson 
and the plurality, concurrence, and dissent in Boudreaux failed to replicate 
this careful, civilian approach. 
C. The Root of the Problem: Forgetting the Roots 
The pervasive problems in the Boudreaux opinions stem from a 
misapplication of Louisiana’s civilian principles in three distinct ways. 
First, the justices’ analyses illustrate an incorporation of common law 
elements. Second, the justices misapplied doctrinal analysis to support 
their positions. Finally, and most importantly, the justices evinced a clearly 
misguided application of proper civilian methodology. 
1. Louisiana: Where the Common Law Should Not be So Common 
The first error by the justices was their use of common law methods 
of analyses as opposed to proper civilian methods. Louisiana is a unique 
state that has a legal system based on both the common and civil law, and 
that mixture results in judges who “giv[e] elaborate statements of facts and 
discussion of precedents—even when interpreting and applying the Civil 
Code.”143 Applying common law methods of interpretation to strictly 
civilian areas of the law is a temptation in Louisiana jurisprudence, leading 
to a mixture of incompatible legal concepts. The common law includes a 
focus on the specific facts with a narrowly tailored holding, antithetical to 
the civilian approach that focuses on applying generalized rules.144 By not 
striking a proper balance between the general law and specific facts, the 
Court can easily forget about the guiding principles of the law, as is 
apparent in the Boudreaux analyses. The plurality actually took that 
explicit position: “Our holding today is strictly limited to the facts before 
us.”145 
The common law also includes a primary focus on prior jurisprudence 
when arriving at a result, rather than focusing on the written law and 
doctrine. Civil law methodology, on the other hand, focuses on “legal 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. Dennis, supra note 60, at 1. 
 144. Tetley, supra note 63, at 702 (“Common law jurisprudence sets out a new 
specific rule to a new specific set of facts . . . while civil law jurisprudence applies 
general principles.”). 
 145. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 564 (La. 2015). 
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principles” and their meaning and function “in terms of rights and 
obligations.”146 The starting point for the civil law is thus the general legal 
principles as opposed to the holdings of previous cases. With such a 
strained analysis, the Court easily erred in the application of the various 
interpretive tools at its disposal. The plurality’s ultimate conclusion 
follows after stating, “[t]his court has declared that ‘servitudes are 
restraints on the free disposal and use of property, and are not . . . entitled 
to be viewed with favor by the law.’”147 Although the maxim stated by the 
plurality that doubts about servitudes are to be resolved without restraining 
the landowner is actually rooted in the civilian doctrine,148 the plurality 
chose to cite prior cases rather than either the law or the doctrine that has 
analyzed the maxim.149 As compared with pages of confusing analysis, the 
one statement that the plurality roots in jurisprudence appears to lead 
directly to the eventual holding.  
This inordinate focus on jurisprudence led the Court to neglect one 
vital Civil Code article on the interpretation of servitudes. When there are 
ambiguities involved in determining the type of right at issue, the Code 
provides: “When the right granted be of a nature to confer an advantage 
on an estate, it is presumed to be a predial servitude.”150 The threshold 
issue in whether to apply this interpretive article is whether there is 
actually a right at issue. Because of the alleged permission given by the 
Weills for Boudreaux to be on the land, the Court automatically foreclosed 
on the possibility that Boudreaux could have acquired any kind of right.151 
Such a conclusion does not follow,152 but it instead prevented the Court 
from engaging in a complete analysis.  
In Levet, as in Boudreaux, there were no written documents or 
definitive testimony to establish what kind of right, if any, the supposed 
prescriber had established. Not allowing permission to be on the land to 
defeat a full analysis, however, the Levet Court applied the predecessor to 
this article, concluding that a predial servitude had been created by 
acquisitive prescription.153 Applying that analysis in Boudreaux, the 
characteristics of a predial servitude of passage become apparent. The 
dominant estate, owned by Boudreaux, was farmland that required 
                                                                                                             
 146. Tetley, supra note 63, at 702. 
 147. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564–65. 
 148. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 cmt. b (2017). 
 149. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564–65 (citing to three prior cases rather than 
the Civil Code or to civilian doctrine). 
 150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 733. 
 151. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564. 
 152. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
 153. Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 1 So. 672, 674 (La. 1887). 
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convenient access to the public roadway to use the land as intended.154 
This use comports with both the meaning of a predial servitude and of a 
servitude of passage.155 Even if servitudes are not to be favored in the law, 
such a rule should only apply if, even after examining the supposed right 
in question, ambiguities remain. In Boudreaux, Boudreaux claimed a right 
that was clearly “of a nature to confer an advantage on an estate,”156 
establishing a rebuttable presumption in favor of Boudreaux. Even if 
jurisprudence says otherwise, the Code, being read as a unified whole, 
should always be at the forefront of legal analysis. 
2. No Doctrine in the House: Misuse of a Critical Civilian 
Component 
The second failure by the justices is their misuse of doctrinal analysis 
to support the reasoning of their opinions. The plurality cited the Louisiana 
Civil Law Treatise on Predial Servitudes when discussing acquisitive 
prescription of a servitude.157 The portion of the Treatise cited by the 
Court, in turn, discusses the French historical background of acquisitive 
prescription of servitudes, yet there is no further discussion within the 
opinion concerning how France or other civilian jurisdictions have since 
handled the issue.158 Furthermore, since the first Louisiana Civil Code, a 
subsequent revision has recognized discontinuous apparent servitudes,159 
which is an issue still not recognized under French law.160 Though there is 
some disconnection between the French background and current Louisiana 
law, there is no discussion within the opinion involving other civilian 
jurisdictions that have similar provisions to the current Louisiana law.161 
The major problem with the use of French doctrine, or Louisiana doctrine 
based on historical French sources, is that those commentaries stem from 
                                                                                                             
 154. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560. 
 155. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (explaining that the dominant estate enjoys a 
benefit); id. art. 705 (explaining that a servitude of passage allows, inter alia, 
persons and vehicles to pass on land). 
 156. Id. art. 733. 
 157. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–63. 
 158. Id. at 563. 
 159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a. 
 160. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 6:31, in 4 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 435 (4th ed. 2014). 
 161. Greece allows for acquisitive prescription on all servitudes, and Italy, like 
Louisiana, allows prescription on apparent servitudes. A. N. Yiannopoulos, 
Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L. 
REV. 57, 58 (1982) [hereinafter Creation of Servitudes]. 
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the legal principle that one could only acquire continuous predial 
servitudes through prescription.162  
Writing at a time when the French legislature as a policy matter chose 
to disallow acquisition of any discontinuous predial servitude,163 there was 
no need for commentators to delineate what types of acts could lead to 
prescription or what would lead to precarious quasi-possession. The 
legislative equation of simple acts of tolerance and good neighborliness 
with discontinuous predial servitudes led to analyses that acquisitive 
prescription on discontinuous servitudes could not occur: “[The 
landowner] is therefore deemed to tolerate such acts through a spirit of 
good vicinage . . . . These servitudes, when not based upon a title, are 
tainted with precariousness. . . . And these circumstances make 
prescription impossible.”164 Because current Louisiana law on acquisitive 
prescription of servitudes differs from the historical French law, the 
justices should have recognized this difference and incorporated it into 
their analyses. 
3. The Final Straw: A Strong Civilian Foundation but a Weak 
Building 
The third, final, and most unfortunate error of the justices in 
Boudreaux is their misapplication of methodology and their incomplete 
analyses of the relevant Civil Code articles. Because of the importance of 
proper classification in property law, particularly with such a difficult 
topic as predial servitudes,165 proper civilian methodology is critical “to 
consider codal provisions that have been hidden between the lines for the 
last thirty years.”166 The acquisition of a discontinuous predial servitude 
of passage is a relatively new issue in property law,167 so the charge on the 
                                                                                                             
 162. When drafting the French Civil Code, a compromise between competing 
factions was reached in which “acquisitive prescription was accepted only as to 
continuous and apparent servitudes.” Id. at 59. 
 163. FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 310–11 
(1878), translated by John Randall Trahan (2015) (on file with author). 
 164. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 738–39. 
 165. Boris Kozolchyk, On Predial Servitudes, Civil Law Institutions and 
Common Law Attitudes—Apropos of Yiannopoulos’ Predial Servitudes, 59 TUL. 
L. REV. 517, 517 (1984) (discussing the difficulty of conceptualizing the subject 
of predial servitudes). 
 166. Hannan, supra note 27, at 938. 
 167. Because of its enactment effective January 1, 1978, the first date for 30 
year acquisitive prescription of a discontinuous predial servitude was January 1, 
2008. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a. Boudreaux represents the first case 
dealing with the issue. 
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courts is to “carefully consider the effects of these unprecedented 
servitudes under the Revision.”168 Particularly in an area with such little 
guidance, civilian judges must sometimes reason a pari, or by analogy, an 
important method in civilian methodology,169 to resolve the conflict in 
accord with the Civil Code.170 In this case, the Code itself provides that 
judges are to proceed according to analogy.171 With a cursory glance at the 
opinions in Boudreaux, it may appear that the justices adhered to these 
civilian principles with their citation of many Civil Code articles. 
However, the problem is that there is a civilian façade, but a lack of any 
detailed analysis or application.172 For example, the plurality wrote for the 
reader to “see” a Civil Code article that does not discuss quasi-possession 
at all, and the Court failed to explain how one should analogize from that 
article to the issue being considered.173  
The Court proceeded with its incomplete use of the Civil Code by 
misstating a critical aspect of the law of quasi-possession of an incorporeal 
immovable: “Louisiana Civil Code article 742, . . . provides ‘the laws 
governing acquisitive prescription of immovable property apply to 
apparent servitudes.’”174 Although the cited article is ostensibly applicable 
to Boudreaux, the plurality relegated to a passing footnote the later 
fundamental article that states how the laws are to apply to acquisitive 
prescription of predial servitudes: by analogy.175 The fact that the issue 
before the Court involved little legislative guidance, almost nonexistent 
jurisprudence, and scarce commentary does not excuse a failure to explain 
                                                                                                             
 168. Hannan, supra note 27, at 940. 
 169. Dennis, supra note 60, at 11–12 (discussing the use of reasoning by 
analogy). 
 170. Id. 
 171. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421. 
 172. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. 2015) (citing 
to various Civil Code articles involving possession properly so-called, including 
articles 3424, 3435, and 3476, regarding corporeal possession and the qualities of 
effective possession, without any discussion on how to apply them by analogy to 
the quasi-possession of an incorporeal predial servitude). 
 173. When explaining that Boudreaux would need to give actual notice to the 
landowner to end his precarious possession, the plurality cites to the Louisiana 
Civil Code, but the cited article, 3478, does not say how it would apply to a 
servitude owner. The plurality fails to explain how to apply it by analogy. Id. at 
562; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 3478 (explaining how a precarious possessor, rather 
than a precarious quasi-possessor, would terminate precarious possession and 
begin to acquisitively prescribe). 
 174. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 563. 
 175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421. For the passing footnote, see Boudreaux, 167 
So. 3d at 560 n.2. 
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and incorporate more fully the most relevant Code article on the issue. 
Beyond oblique references, none of the justices included any discussion 
on how to proceed by analogy, and they failed to indicate any legal 
differences when a person is prescribing on an incorporeal servitude rather 
than on a corporeal thing like land.176 
Although the plurality and concurring opinions relied heavily on the 
concept of “acts of simple tolerance,” all of the opinions failed to articulate 
a clear definition of the concept. In keeping with its misapplication of 
civilian doctrine, the Court, though citing to it briefly,177 failed to fully use 
one of the tools available to Louisiana civilians, the Dictionary of the Civil 
Code, which itself provides a useful definition of acts of simple tolerance: 
“[E]ntering onto the land of another which, because it is done with the 
express or tacit consent of the owner, does not amount to an act of 
possession capable of establishing acquisitive prescription.”178 If the 
justices had cited to this definition, and accordingly adapted it by analogy 
to acquisitive prescription of incorporeal servitudes, then the resulting 
analyses would have fit better within the Civil Code’s framework by 
providing a foundational premise. 
Although using some foreign doctrine, the justices failed to include 
any relevant commentary from Marcel Planiol, who also provided a clear 
foundation for acts of tolerance and precariousness: “[Precariousness of a 
servitude] consists in accomplishing, on somebody else’s property, 
through mere tolerance, acts which would be the exercise of a servitude if 
performed in virtue of a right.”179 The justices would have had to place 
this definition into context, however, because, unlike the consistent use 
made by Boudreaux of the passageway,180 the acts described by Planiol 
are those “performed at long intervals . . . compatible with the ordinary 
enjoyment of the thing by its owner.”181 Planiol equated “acts of mere 
tolerance” with “be[ing] on good terms with . . . neighbors,”182 appearing 
to describe acts of tolerance as involving a much lower level of activity 
                                                                                                             
 176. E.g., Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560–61; id. at 568–69 (Weimer, J., 
concurring); id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 572 n.9 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 178. CORNU, supra note 36, at 556. 
 179. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 742. The writings of Marcel Planiol, a 
renowned French civil law professor, are so insightful because of his highly 
influential treatise on the French Civil Code, since translated by the Louisiana 
State Law Institute as an important interpretive tool of the meaning of the 
Louisiana Civil Code. Algero, supra note 2, at 794 n.87. 
 180. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560. 
 181. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 742. 
 182. Id. at 743. 
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than that of Boudreaux. Planiol’s conclusion is that someone who 
performs these acts on another’s property implicitly recognizes permission 
from the landowner and cannot prescribe.183 The concurrence cited this 
conclusion without any of the surrounding context,184 so there is no 
understanding of how Planiol’s analysis was formed by the older, 
traditional French model.  
Because of the change in legislative policy between the traditional 
French approach and the modern Louisiana approach, the justices should 
have placed the doctrine into its proper context and then reasoned by 
analogy. With a discontinuous predial servitude like a servitude of passage, 
acts that constitute corpus are similar to those acts that would only constitute 
acts of simple tolerance.185 Because Louisiana law now allows prescription 
on these types of servitudes, the analysis cannot simply end with equating 
acts of a discontinuous apparent predial servitude with acts of tolerance. 
Instead, the analysis becomes fact-intensive, with the fact finder having 
“complete discretion to determine whether the acts that are claimed to be 
acts of possession . . . have or have not been exercised . . . [as] simple 
tolerance.”186 The fact finder must distinguish between acts of simple 
tolerance that include “benevolence”187 or “express or tacit permission of 
the owner”188 from those acts that would be intense and continuous enough 
that they would “constitute an impingement on the rights of another.”189  
Boudreaux’s aggressive and intense use of the pathway for over 50 
years to move heavy farm equipment, among other uses,190 appears to go 
beyond the acts of simple tolerance envisioned by the French 
commentators. At the very least, the decision of such a fact-intensive issue 
that seems to go beyond simple tolerance should have been within the 
pervasive authority of the fact finder, whose conclusions should be entitled 
to deference.191 Faced with a new legal issue and armed with little actual 
guidance, the Court should have remained faithful to the Civil Code and 
proper civilian analysis, but its failure resulted in confusion of the issue at 
hand, unclear definitions, and uncertainty in the ensuing law. 
                                                                                                             
 183. Id. 
 184. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 570–71 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 185. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 310–11. 
 186. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT 
CIVIL FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS 940–41 (Maurice Picard rev. 2d ed. 1952), translated 
by John Randall Trahan (2015) (on file with author). 
 187. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 311. 
 188. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 186, at 940. 
 189. Id. at 942. 
 190. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015). 
 191. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 312–13. 
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IV. SOLUTION: IT’S IN THE CODE . . . OR SHOULD BE 
Although it is too late to fix the erroneous analysis in Boudreaux, 
Louisiana judges can still ensure that a misapplication of the civilian 
approach to the private law does not happen again. It is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to provide a comprehensive solution to the 
misapplication of civilian methodology, but there are three ways in which 
courts can return to their civilian roots. First, Louisiana judges must return 
to the Civil Code and its basic legal principles. Even when the Civil Code 
may not be as clear or complete as might be ideal, it remains the proper 
foundation to build a subsequent analysis. Second, judges must refrain 
from the tendency to elevate detailed facts over the law and instead keep 
clarity and proper categorization in the forefront of their analyses. Finally, 
when dealing specifically with the issue presented in Boudreaux, where 
courts are unable to apply the law properly, whether directly or by analogy, 
the legislature, rather than the judiciary, must provide a remedy. 
A. The Civil Code: Louisiana’s Ace in the Hole 
Any type of solution must first recognize the primacy of the Louisiana 
Civil Code as containing one of the primary sources of law—legislation.192 
Solutions to new legal problems, whether acquisitive prescription or 
something else, must fit within the general framework of the Code, which 
is a “bod[y] of coherent and organized rules and not a mere ‘mosaic 
without unity.’”193 Acquisitive prescription of discontinuous predial 
servitudes might be a new problem, but new problems pose no 
impossibilities in the civilian tradition because “Civil Code articles tend 
to be written in general terms . . . to last through time and be applied to 
changing circumstances.”194 By not drawing on the Code’s general 
precepts, courts ignore a fundamental foundation that provides, at the very 
least, a starting point for further analysis. Although the justices may have 
been confused as to how to handle a new problem, “when viewed through 
the proper lens, the framework for adjudicating these new rights [was] 
already in place.”195 The tools for the justices to use were available right 
in front of them: the articles of the Civil Code and the civilian 
methodology of reasoning by analogy. Fortunately, those same tools 
remain readily available for all future judges when facing similarly new 
and complex legal issues. 
                                                                                                             
 192. Algero, supra note 2, at 793. 
 193. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1084. 
 194. Algero, supra note 2, at 793. 
 195. Hannan, supra note 27, at 987. 
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Civilian judges have a sworn duty to give “the public consistent, 
faithful[,] and equal application of the legislated laws.”196 This duty to 
uphold the legislated laws entails much more than recitation of the Civil 
Code, but rather requires a rigorous application of its articles. Accordingly, 
when deciding a case in an ambiguous area of the law, the judge should 
stay “as closely as possible to the values of the Code” when arriving at the 
proper solution.197 If judges still cannot make sense of the law,198 and 
cannot proceed by analogy, the Code provides the basis for a solution: 
“[P]roceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to 
justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”199 Judges, however, must clearly 
state that they are proceeding in such a way, and, even in equity, they 
“should keep the Civil Code . . . at the forefront,” making careful use of 
analogous legislation.200 Judges cannot simply proceed in their analyses as 
though the Civil Code articles are simply another piece of ordinary 
legislation because the Code represents a unified whole.201 When the judge 
recognizes that all of the different parts of the Code interact and form a 
coherent whole, then there is less potential for narrow results that might 
comport with one part of the Code but contradict another part. 
B. A Clear Analysis Begins with a Clear Premise 
Clarity of terms and proper categorization are two essential features in 
a proper civilian presentation of the law.202 Because the civil law is 
organized as an internally consistent system, judges must define the issue 
at hand precisely and proceed with consistent logic. Proper categorization 
and clear terminology are especially imperative when proceeding by 
analogy: “Classifications by categories and successive sub-categories 
make it possible to apply . . . the rules regulating a wide range of situations 
analogous to all the particular situations which fall under those rules.”203 
When proceeding with proper codal categorization of issues, not only do 
                                                                                                             
 196. Dennis, supra note 60, at 2. 
 197. Id. at 3. 
 198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017) (explaining law is both legislation and custom). 
 199. Id. art. 4. 
 200. Algero, supra note 2, at 797. 
 201. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1079 (“[C]odification is to be contrasted with 
simple legislation tailored to the circumstances.” (emphasis added)). 
 202. Tetley, supra note 63, at 709 (“The civil law traditional method . . . 
consists in characterizing the dispute as belonging a [sic] defined category, and 
then identifying the applicable internal law . . . of the category concerned.”). 
 203. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1083 (discussing the importance of a codified 
system and its unique way of proceeding in interpretation).  
2017] COMMENT 1173 
 
 
 
judges produce analyses that are easier for practitioners and even 
laypeople to read, but they also reduce their chances of applying civilian 
principles incorrectly. Had the justices in Boudreaux followed this step, 
they would have averted both the conflation of two distinct legal issues 
and the incorporation of analyses inconsistent with the codal framework. 
C. The Legislative Solution: A Balancing Act 
If a good-faith use of civilian methodology cannot solve a legal 
problem or if a judicial solution is untenable, the question becomes 
whether the legislature, as the proper lawmaker, should intervene. 
Regarding the issues in Boudreaux, the legislature could possibly clarify 
and expand the solitary directive to analogize the articles involving 
possession to quasi-possession. At the same time, implicit in the ability to 
craft new legislation is also the responsibility of the legislature to respect 
its own duty “to set, by taking a broad approach, the general propositions 
of the law . . . and not to get down [sic] the details of questions which may 
arise in particular instances.”204 Respecting this responsibility, the 
legislature could still enact a new codal section specifically applicable to 
the quasi-possession of incorporeal real rights, lessening the need to 
analogize in an area of the law that is difficult to conceptualize on a case-
by-case basis. 
Because of all of the references in both the Louisiana Civil Law 
Treatise on Predial Servitudes205 and the Boudreaux opinions206 to “acts of 
simple tolerance” or other synonymous terms, one place for the legislature 
to start would be to provide a legal definition for the concept, especially 
in relation to the quasi-possession of servitudes. Although a civil code 
generally eschews the inclusion of detailed definitions,207 such a use is 
warranted in this case because of the uniquely difficult conceptual nature 
of the issue. The Court seemed to struggle with the concept that permission 
to use the underlying land does not ipso facto make the possession of an 
incorporeal servitude precarious, so clarification of acts of tolerance and 
how they relate to both corporeal and incorporeal things would be useful. 
Because of the fact-intensive nature of determining whether acts go 
beyond simple tolerance,208 a definition would at least provide a 
foundation for the fact finder to begin an analysis, especially in the case of 
lay jurors who already lack a background in civilian legal reasoning.  
                                                                                                             
 204. Id. at 1082. 
 205. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 160, § 6:36, at 451–52.  
 206. E.g., Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562–63 (La. 2015). 
 207. Tetley, supra note 63, at 703–04. 
 208. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 312–13. 
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On the one hand, people should expect that “certain invasions in the 
spirit of good neighborhood” are customary among neighboring 
landowners and would not ordinarily lead to the prescription of a 
servitude.209 On the other hand, however, if all invasions are excluded, 
then there would be an effective abrogation of the law allowing such 
acquisitive prescription. The question then appears to become one of the 
intensity or duration of such an invasion. The types of actions which could 
lead to the creation of a servitude also include a distinct public policy 
element: when should neighboring landowners be in danger of losing a 
part of their ownership rights through the creation of a servitude? Related 
to that issue, in the interest of amicable resolution and judicial economy, 
there is also a question of when should a landowner be compelled to evict 
a neighbor or bring him or her to court. Instead of allowing judges to 
decide such substantive civilian legal principles on an ad hoc basis, it is 
instead within the proper realm of the legislature as lawmaker to decide 
those issues, ensuring a consistent framework and foundation from which 
courts can then provide more specific applications.  
D. Right Result? 
Whether the result would have been different in Boudreaux is not the 
critical issue addressed by this Comment. Although concededly the result 
makes a difference for the application of the law in Louisiana—and this 
Comment indicates where the law potentially stands—the most important 
consideration is how the result was reached. With confusing language, 
improper definitions and categorization, and a misapplication of the Civil 
Code, why there might have been a change in the law and how that change 
should be interpreted are both left unanswered. A proper methodology 
may have arrived at the same result, although it is more likely that the 
opposite result, especially if given to the fact finder,210 would have 
obtained. Regardless of what the right result should have been, a proper 
civilian methodology is fundamental to arriving at a conclusion that is both 
articulable and logical. 
CONCLUSION 
Confronting a yet unresolved legal issue, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court should have fully relied on its civilian heritage to resolve Boudreaux 
v. Cummings. Although providing a foundation that promised a distinctly 
civilian approach, the Court erred in its application to the underlying 
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complex facts of Boudreaux. Rather than actually interpreting the Civil 
Code as the source of private substantive law within the state, the Court 
failed to provide a proper analysis of an issue minimally addressed by the 
relevant Code articles. By neglecting to follow its premises to their logical 
conclusions, the Court not only collapsed two distinct legal issues into one 
issue but also created an unsettled analysis regarding the state of legal 
presumptions within the law of possession. Although an admittedly mixed 
jurisdiction, Louisiana still professes to be civilian in the realm of 
substantive private law, and the courts should back this assertion, not with 
a mere recitation of the Civil Code, but with an actual, good-faith use of 
it. 
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